
Creation of the Court

War criminals have been prosecuted at least since the time of the ancient Greeks, and probably well before that. The idea that there is some common denominator of behaviour, even in the most extreme circumstances of brutal armed conflict, confirms beliefs drawn from philosophy and religion about some of the fundamental values of the human spirit. The early laws and customs of war can be found in the writings of classical authors and historians. Those who breached them were subject to trial and punishment. Modern codifications of this law, such as the detailed text prepared by Columbia University professor Francis Lieber that was applied by Abraham Lincoln to the Union army during the American Civil War, proscribed inhumane conduct and set out sanctions, including the death penalty, for pillage, raping civilians, abuse of prisoners and similar atrocities.¹ Prosecution for war crimes, however, was only conducted by national courts, and these were and remain ineffective when those responsible for the crimes are still in power and their victims remain subjugated. Historically, the prosecution of war crimes was generally restricted to the vanquished or to isolated cases of rogue combatants in the victor's army. National justice systems have often proven themselves to be incapable of being balanced and impartial in such cases.

The first genuinely international trial for the perpetration of atrocities was probably that of Peter von Hagenbach, who was tried in 1474 for atrocities committed during the occupation of Breisach. When the town was retaken, von Hagenbach was charged with war crimes, convicted and beheaded.² But what was surely no more than a curious experiment in medieval international justice was soon overtaken by the sanctity of

¹ Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1863.

² Georg Schwarzenberger, *International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals: The Law of Armed Conflict*, vol. II, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1968, p. 463; M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Court', (1997) 10 *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 11.

State sovereignty resulting from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. With the development of the law of armed conflict in the mid-nineteenth century, concepts of international prosecution for humanitarian abuses slowly began to emerge. One of the founders of the Red Cross movement, which grew up in Geneva in the 1860s, urged a draft statute for an international criminal court. Its task would be to prosecute breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1864 and other humanitarian norms. But Gustav Moynier's innovative proposal was much too radical for its time.³

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 represent the first significant codification of the laws of war in an international treaty. They include an important series of provisions dealing with the protection of civilian populations. Article 46 of the Regulations that are annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 enshrines the respect of '[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice'.⁴ Other provisions of the Regulations protect cultural objects and the private property of civilians. The preamble to the Conventions recognizes that they are incomplete but promises that, until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, 'the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience'. This provision is known as the Martens clause, after the Russian diplomat who drafted it.⁵

The Hague Conventions, as international treaties, were meant to impose obligations and duties upon States and were not intended to create criminal liability for individuals. They declared certain acts to be illegal, but not criminal, as can be seen from the absence of any suggestion that there is a sanction for their violation. Yet within only a few years, the Hague Conventions were being presented as a source of the law of war crimes. In 1913, a commission of inquiry sent by the Carnegie Foundation to investigate atrocities committed during the Balkan Wars used the provisions of Hague Convention IV as a basis for its description of

³ Christopher Keith Hall, 'The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court', (1998) 322 *International Review of the Red Cross* 57.

⁴ Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 3 *Martens Nouveau Recueil* (3d) 461. For the 1899 treaty, see Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, 91 *British Foreign and State Treaties* 988.

⁵ Theodor Meron, 'The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience', (2000) 94 *American Journal of International Law* 78.

war crimes.⁶ Immediately following World War I, the Commission on Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties, established to examine allegations of war crimes committed by the Central Powers, did the same.⁷ But actual prosecution for violations of the Hague Conventions would have to wait until Nuremberg. Offences against the laws and customs of war, known as ‘Hague Law’ because of their roots in the 1899 and 1907 Conventions, are codified in the 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia⁸ and in Article 8(2)(b), (e) and (f) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

As World War I wound to a close, public opinion, particularly in England, was increasingly keen on criminal prosecution of those generally considered to be responsible for the war. There was much pressure to go beyond violations of the laws and customs of war and to prosecute, in addition, the waging of war itself in violation of international treaties. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Allies debated the wisdom of such trials as well as their legal basis. The United States was generally hostile to the idea, arguing that this would be *ex post facto* justice. Responsibility for breach of international conventions, and above all for crimes against the ‘laws of humanity’, was a question of morality, not law, said the US delegation. But this was a minority position. The resulting compromise dropped the concept of ‘laws of humanity’ but promised the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II ‘for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’. The Versailles Treaty formally arraigned the defeated German emperor and pledged the creation of a ‘special tribunal’ for his trial.⁹ Wilhelm of Hohenzollern had fled to neutral Holland, which refused his extradition, the Dutch Government considering that the charges consisted of retroactive criminal law. He lived out his life there and died, ironically, in 1941, after his country of refuge had fallen under German occupation in the early years of World War II.

The Versailles Treaty also recognized the right of the Allies to set up military tribunals to try German soldiers accused of war crimes.¹⁰ Although it

⁶ *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914.

⁷ *Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919.

⁸ Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), Annex, Art. 3.

⁹ Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (‘Treaty of Versailles’), (1919) TS 4, Art. 227.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Arts. 228–30.

had accepted the Treaty, when the victors submitted an initial list of more than nine hundred suspects to be surrendered for trial, Germany was able to negotiate a compromise whereby a much smaller number would be tried, and by the German courts rather than those of the victors. In the end only a dozen men, prison camp commandants and U-boat officers rather than the generals and admirals in Berlin, were brought to justice. Several were acquitted; those found guilty were sentenced to modest terms of imprisonment, often nothing more than time already served in custody prior to conviction. The trials looked rather more like disciplinary proceedings of the German army than any international reckoning. Known as the 'Leipzig Trials', the perceived failure of this early attempt at international justice haunted efforts in the inter-war years to develop a permanent international tribunal and were grist to the mill of those who opposed war crimes trials for the Nazi leaders. But two of the judgments of the Leipzig court involving the sinking of the hospital ships *Dover Castle* and *Llandoverly Castle*, and the murder of the survivors, mainly Canadian medical personnel, are cited to this day as precedents on the scope of the defence of superior orders.¹¹

The Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, governing the peace with Turkey, also provided for war crimes trials.¹² The proposed prosecutions against the Turks were even more radical, going beyond the trial of suspects whose victims were either Allied soldiers or civilians in occupied territories to include subjects of the Ottoman Empire, notably victims of the genocide of the Armenian people. This was the embryo of what would later be called crimes against humanity. However, the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified by Turkey, and no international trials were undertaken. The Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which contained a 'Declaration of Amnesty' for all offences committed between 1 August 1914 and 20 November 1922.¹³

Although these initial efforts to create an international criminal court were unsuccessful, they stimulated many international lawyers

¹¹ *German War Trials, Report of Proceedings before the Supreme Court in Leipzig*, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921. See also James F. Willis, *Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982; Gerd Hankel, *Die Leipziger Prozesse*, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003.

¹² (1920) UKTS 11; (1929) 99 (3rd Series), DeMartens, *Recueil général des traités*, No. 12, p. 720 (French version).

¹³ Treaty of Lausanne between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, (1923) 28 LNTS 11, Miscellaneous Provisions, VIII, Declaration of Amnesty.

to devote their attention to the matter during the years that followed. Baron Descamps of Belgium, a member of the Advisory Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, urged the establishment of a 'high court of international justice'. Using language borrowed from the Martens clause in the preamble to the Hague Conventions, Descamps recommended that the jurisdiction of the court include offences 'recognized by the civilized nations but also by the demands of public conscience [and] the dictates of the legal conscience of civilized nations'. The Third Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations declared that Descamps's ideas were 'premature'. Efforts by expert bodies, such as the International Law Association and the International Association of Penal Law, culminated, in 1937, in the adoption of a treaty by the League of Nations that contemplated the establishment of an international criminal court.¹⁴ But, failing a sufficient number of ratifying States, that treaty never came into force.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials

In the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, the Allies affirmed their determination to prosecute the Nazis for war crimes. The United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, composed of representatives of most of the Allies, and chaired by Sir Cecil Hurst of the United Kingdom, was established to set the stage for post-war prosecution. The Commission prepared a 'Draft Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations War Crimes Court', basing its text largely on the 1937 treaty of the League of Nations and inspired by work carried out during the early years of the war by an unofficial body, the London International Assembly.¹⁵ But it was the work of the London Conference, convened at the close of the war and limited to the four major powers – the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union – that laid the groundwork for the prosecutions at Nuremberg. The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was formally adopted on 8 August 1945. It was promptly signed by

¹⁴ Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, League of Nations OJ Spec. Supp. No. 156 (1936), LN Doc. C.547(I).M.384(I).1937. V (1938).

¹⁵ Draft Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations War Crimes Court, UN War Crimes Commission, Doc. C.50(1), 30 September 1944. See William A. Schabas, 'The United Nations War Crimes Commission's Proposal for an International Criminal Court', (2014) 25 *Criminal Law Forum* 171.

representatives of the four powers. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal was annexed to the Agreement.¹⁶ This treaty was eventually adhered to by nineteen other States that, although they played no active role in the Tribunal's activities or the negotiation of its statute, sought to express their support for the concept and indicate the wide international acceptance of the norms the Charter set out.¹⁷

In October 1945, indictments were served on twenty-four Nazi leaders. Their trial, known as the Trial of the Major War Criminals, began the following month. It concluded nearly a year later with the conviction of nineteen defendants and the imposition of sentence of death in twelve cases. The Tribunal's jurisdiction was confined to three categories of offence: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal had been adopted after the crimes had been committed. For this reason it was attacked as constituting *ex post facto* criminalization. Rejecting such arguments, the Tribunal referred to the Hague Conventions, for the war crimes, and to the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, for crimes against peace.¹⁸ The judges also answered that the prohibition of retroactive crimes was a principle of justice and that it would fly in the face of justice to leave the Nazi crimes unpunished. This argument was particularly important with respect to the category of crimes against humanity, for which there was little real precedent, apart from the famous declaration by the three Allied powers in 1915 condemning the Turkish persecution of the Armenians. In the case of charges relating to submarine warfare, the Tribunal said the law had been breached by the German naval forces but it refused to impose a sentence on the offenders after hearing evidence of similar behaviour by British and American sailors.¹⁹

¹⁶ Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Annex, (1951) 82 UNTS 279. See Arieh J. Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment*, Chapel Hill, NC, and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998; *Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949.

¹⁷ Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

¹⁸ The Kellogg–Briand Pact was an international treaty that renounced the use of war as a means to settle international disputes. Previously, war as such was not prohibited by international law. States had erected a network of bilateral and multilateral treaties of non-aggression and alliance to protect themselves from attack and invasion.

¹⁹ *France et al. v. Göring et al.*, (1946) 22 IMT 411, at p. 559. The judgment itself, as well as the transcript of the hearings and the documentary evidence, are reproduced in a

In December 1945, the four Allied powers enacted a somewhat modified version of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, known as Control Council Law No. 10.²⁰ It provided the legal basis for a series of trials before military tribunals that were run by the occupying regime, as well as for subsequent prosecutions by German courts that continued for several decades. Control Council Law No. 10, which was really a form of domestic legislation because it applied to the prosecution of Germans by the courts of the civil authorities, largely borrowed the definition of crimes against humanity found in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal but omitted the latter's insistence on a link between crimes against humanity and the existence of a state of war. This enabled prosecution for pre-1939 atrocities committed against German civilians, including persecution of the Jews and euthanasia of the disabled, although despite the text, the tribunals were still hesitant to recognize international criminality in peacetime. Several important thematic trials were held pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 in the period 1946–8 by American military tribunals. These focused on groups of defendants, such as judges, doctors, bureaucrats and military leaders.²¹

In the Pacific theatre, the victorious Allies established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Japanese war criminals were tried under similar provisions to those used at Nuremberg. The bench was more cosmopolitan, consisting of judges from eleven countries, including India, China and the Philippines, whereas the Nuremberg judges were appointed by the four major powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. Judge Pal of India wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion that reflected his profound anti-colonialist sentiments.²²

forty-two-volume series published in English and French and available in most major reference libraries, as well as on the website of the Library of Congress. The literature on the Nuremberg trial of the major war criminals is extensive. For example, Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992; Guénaél Mettraux, ed., *Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

²⁰ Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity, 20 December 1945, *Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany*, No. 3, 31 January 1946, pp. 50–5.

²¹ Kevin Jon Heller, *The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. The judgments in the cases, as well as much secondary material and documentary evidence, have been published in two series, one by the US government titled *Trials of the War Criminals*, the other by the UK government titled *Law Reports of the Trials of the War Criminals*. Both series are readily available in reference libraries.

²² Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, *The Tokyo International Military Tribunal – A Reappraisal*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

At Nuremberg, Nazi war criminals were charged with what the prosecutors called 'genocide', but the term did not appear in the substantive provisions of the Charter, and the Tribunal convicted them of 'crimes against humanity' for the atrocities committed against the Jewish people of Europe. Within weeks of the judgment, efforts began in the General Assembly of the United Nations to push the law further in this area. In December 1946, a resolution was adopted declaring genocide a crime against international law and calling for the preparation of a convention on the subject.²³ Two years later, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.²⁴ The definition of genocide set out in Article II of the 1948 Convention is incorporated unchanged in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as Article 6. But besides defining the crime and setting out a variety of obligations relating to its prosecution, Article VI of the 1948 Convention said that trial for genocide was to take place before 'a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction'. An early draft of the Genocide Convention prepared by the United Nations Secretariat included a model statute for a court, based on the 1937 treaty developed within the League of Nations, but the proposal was too ambitious for the time, and the conservative drafters stopped short of establishing such an institution.²⁵ Instead, a General Assembly resolution, adopted the same day as the Genocide Convention, on 9 December 1948, called on the International Law Commission to prepare the statute of the court promised by Article VI.²⁶

The International Law Commission

The International Law Commission is a body of experts, named by the United Nations General Assembly, charged with the codification and progressive development of international law. Besides the mandate to

²³ GA Res. 96 (I).

²⁴ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (1951) 78 UNTS 277.

²⁵ William A. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes*, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 62–3.

²⁶ Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, GA Res. 216 B (III).

draft the statute of an international criminal court derived from Article VI of the Genocide Convention, in the post-war euphoria about war crimes prosecution, the General Assembly had also asked the Commission to prepare what are known as the ‘Nuremberg Principles’, a task it completed in 1950,²⁷ and the ‘Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, a job that took considerably longer. The final version of the Code of Crimes was only adopted by the International Law Commission in 1996. Much of the work on the draft statute of an international criminal court and the draft code of crimes went on within the Commission in parallel, almost as if the two tasks were hardly related. The two instruments can be understood by analogy with domestic law. They correspond in a general sense to the definitions of crimes and general principles found in criminal or penal codes (the ‘code of crimes’) and the institutional and procedural framework found in codes of criminal procedure (the ‘statute’).

Meanwhile, alongside the work of the International Law Commission, the General Assembly also established a committee charged with drafting the statute of an international criminal court. Composed of seventeen States, it submitted its report and draft statute in 1952.²⁸ A new committee, created by the General Assembly to review the draft statute in the light of comments by Member States, reported to the General Assembly in 1954.²⁹ The International Law Commission made considerable progress on its draft code and actually submitted a proposal in 1954.³⁰ Then the General Assembly suspended the mandates, ostensibly pending the sensitive task of defining the crime of aggression.³¹ By then, political tensions associated with the Cold War had made progress on the international criminal court agenda virtually impossible.

²⁷ The Principles begin with an important declaration: ‘Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.’ They proceed with statements excluding the defences of official capacity, superior orders and retroactive criminal law, they define the categories of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and provide that complicity in such crimes is also punishable.

²⁸ Report of the Committee on International Criminal Court Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/2135 (1952).

²⁹ Report of the Committee on International Criminal Court Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/2645 (1954).

³⁰ *Yearbook . . . 1954*, vol. I, 267th meeting, para. 39, p. 131 (ten in favour, with one abstention). On the 1954 draft code in general, see D. H. N. Johnson, ‘Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, (1955) 4 *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 445.

³¹ GA Res. 897 (IX).

The General Assembly eventually adopted a definition of aggression, in 1974,³² but work did not immediately resume on the proposed international criminal court. In 1981, the General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to revive activity on the draft code of crimes.³³ Doudou Thiam was designated the Special Rapporteur of the Commission. He produced annual reports on various aspects of the draft code for more than a decade. Thiam's work, and the associated debates in the Commission, addressed a range of questions, including definitions of crimes, criminal participation, defences and penalties.³⁴ A substantially revised version of the 1954 draft code was provisionally adopted by the Commission in 1991 and then sent to Member States for their reaction.

Throughout the 1980s, the Commission reminded the General Assembly that there was limited interest in an international code if there was not to be an international court charged with enforcing it. However, the General Assembly did not react until late 1989, a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Trinidad and Tobago, one of several Caribbean States plagued by narcotics problems and related transnational crime issues, initiated a resolution in the General Assembly directing the International Law Commission to consider the subject of an international criminal court within the context of its work on the draft code of crimes.³⁵ Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam made an initial presentation on the subject in 1992. By 1993, the Commission had prepared a draft statute, this time under the direction of Special Rapporteur James Crawford. The following year, in 1994, the Commission submitted the final version of its draft statute for an international criminal court to the General Assembly.³⁶

The International Law Commission's draft statute of 1994 focused on procedural and organizational matters, leaving the question of defining the crimes and the associated legal principles to the code of crimes, which it had yet to complete. Two years later, at its 1996 session, the Commission adopted the final draft of the 'Code of Crimes against the Peace and

³² GA Res. 3314 (XXIX). ³³ UN Doc. A/RES/36/106.

³⁴ These materials appear in the annual reports of the International Law Commission.

³⁵ UN Doc. A/RES/44/39, para. 1.

³⁶ James Crawford, 'The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal', (1994) 88 *American Journal of International Law* 140; James Crawford, 'The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court', (1995) 89 *American Journal of International Law* 404. For the International Law Commission's discussion of the history of the draft statute, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May–22 July 1994, UN Doc. A/49/10, chapter II, paras. 23–41.

Security of Mankind'.³⁷ The draft statute of 1994 and the draft code of 1996 played a seminal role in the preparation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia remarked that 'the Draft Code is an authoritative international instrument which, depending upon the specific question at issue, may (i) constitute evidence of customary law, or (ii) shed light on customary rules which are of uncertain content or are in the process of formation, or, at the very least, (iii) be indicative of the legal views of eminently qualified publicists representing the major legal systems of the world'.³⁸

The *Ad Hoc* Tribunals

While the draft statute of an international criminal court was being considered in the International Law Commission, events compelled the creation of a court on an *ad hoc* basis to address the atrocities being committed in the former Yugoslavia. Already in mid-1991, there had been talk in Europe of establishing a tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders following the Gulf War. In late 1992, as war raged in Bosnia, a Commission of Experts established by the Security Council identified a range of war crimes and crimes against humanity that had been committed and that were continuing. It urged the establishment of an international criminal tribunal, an idea that had originally been recommended by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, who themselves were acting on a proposal from French constitutional judge Robert Badinter. The proposal was endorsed by the General Assembly in a December 1992 resolution. The rapporteurs appointed under the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hans Corell, Gro Hillestad Thune and Helmut Türk, took the initiative to prepare a draft statute. Several governments also submitted draft proposals or otherwise commented on the creation of a tribunal.³⁹

³⁷ Timothy L. H. McCormack and G. J. Simpson, 'The International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An Appraisal of the Substantive Provisions', (1994) 5 *Criminal Law Forum* 1; Jean Allain and John R. W. D. Jones, 'A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind', (1997) 8 *European Journal of International Law* 100.

³⁸ *Furundžija* (IT-95-17/1-T), Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 227.

³⁹ For a general overview of the Tribunal, see the companion to this volume: William A. Schabas, *The UN International Criminal Tribunals, Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

On 22 February 1993, the Security Council decided on the establishment of a tribunal mandated to prosecute 'persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991'.⁴⁰ The draft proposed by the Secretary-General was adopted without modification by the Security Council.⁴¹ According to the Secretary-General's report, the tribunal was to apply rules of international humanitarian law that are 'beyond any doubt part of the customary law'.⁴² The Statute clearly borrowed from the work then underway within the International Law Commission on the statute and the code of crimes, in effect combining the two into an instrument that both defined the crimes and established the procedure before the court. The Tribunal's territorial jurisdiction was confined within the frontiers of the former Yugoslavia. Temporally, it was entitled to prosecute offences beginning in 1991, leaving its end point to be established by the Security Council.

In November 1994, acting on a request from Rwanda, the Security Council voted to create a second *ad hoc* tribunal, charged with the prosecution of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries during 1994.⁴³ Its Statute closely resembles that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, although the war crimes provisions reflect the fact that the Rwandan genocide took place within the context of a purely internal armed conflict. The resolution creating the Tribunal expressed the Council's 'grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda' and referred to the reports of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, as well as the preliminary report of the Commission of Experts, which the Council had established earlier in the year.

The Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals were in effect joined at the hip, sharing not only virtually identical statutes but also some of their institutions. The Security Council built in overlapping provisions, so that initially the Prosecutor was the same for both tribunals, as was the composition of the Appeals Chamber. The consequence, at least in theory, was

⁴⁰ UN Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). ⁴¹ UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).

⁴² Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704.

⁴³ UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).

economy of scale as well as uniformity of both prosecutorial policy and appellate jurisprudence. The first major judgment by the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the *Tadić* jurisdictional decision of 2 October 1995, clarified important legal issues relating to the creation of the body.⁴⁴ It also pointed the Tribunal toward an innovative and progressive view of war crimes law, going well beyond the post–World War II precedents by declaring that crimes against humanity could be committed in peacetime and by establishing the punishability of war crimes under international law when perpetrated in internal armed conflicts.

Subsequent rulings of the *ad hoc* tribunals on a variety of matters fed the debates on the creation of an international criminal court. The findings in *Tadić* with respect to the scope of war crimes were essentially incorporated into Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The *obiter dictum* of the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal declaring that crimes against humanity could be committed in time of peace and not just in wartime, as had been the case at Nuremberg, was also endorsed, in the text of Article 7. But other judgments, such as a controversial holding that excluded recourse to a defence of duress,⁴⁵ prompted drafters of the Rome Statute to enact a provision ensuring precisely the opposite.⁴⁶ The issue of ‘national security’ information, ignored by the International Law Commission, was thrust to the forefront of the debates after the Yugoslavia Tribunal ordered Croatia to produce government documents⁴⁷ and resulted in one of the lengthiest and most enigmatic provisions in the final text of the Rome Statute.⁴⁸ The Rome Conference also departed from some of the approaches taken by the Security Council itself, choosing, for example, to recognize a limited defence of superior orders whereas the Council’s drafters had preferred simply to exclude this with an unambiguous provision, which had also been the approach taken at Nuremberg. But the Tribunals did more than simply set legal precedent to guide the drafters. They also provided a reassuring model of what an international criminal court might look like. This was particularly important in debates concerning the role of the Prosecutor. The integrity, neutrality and good judgment of Richard

⁴⁴ *Tadić* (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995.

⁴⁵ *Erdemović* (IT-96-22-A), Sentencing Appeal, 7 October 1997.

⁴⁶ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 31(1)(d).

⁴⁷ *Blaškić* (IT-95-14-AR108bis), Objection to the Issue of Subpoena Duces Tecum, 29 October 1997.

⁴⁸ Rome Statute, Art. 72.

Goldstone, the first operational Prosecutor of the Tribunal, and of his successor, Louise Arbour, answered those who warned of the dangers of a reckless and irresponsible ‘Dr Strangelove prosecutor’.

Although by the mid-1990s attention had shifted from the *ad hoc* tribunals to the establishment of the permanent court, the creation of temporary institutions was not ruled out even after the Rome Statute was adopted. In 2000, the Security Council instructed the Secretary-General to establish such an institution to deal with atrocities committed in Sierra Leone during the 1990s. It was a leaner and more focused version of the *ad hoc* tribunals, reflecting growing concerns within the Security Council about the cost of international justice. The International Criminal Court was already in the process of being established, but its temporal jurisdiction clause ruled out prosecutions for crimes committed before entry into force. Thus, the International Criminal Court was not in a position to assume responsibility for prosecutions concerning the Sierra Leone civil war. As a result, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was born in January 2002.⁴⁹

In 2005, the United States argued for the establishment of yet another *ad hoc* tribunal.⁵⁰ The purpose was to address atrocities committed in the Darfur region of western Sudan. But because there was no issue about the temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, given that all of the relevant events had occurred since the Rome Statute’s entry into force on 1 July 2002, there was very strong momentum from other States to refer the case to the new Court rather than to create another institution. In the result, the United States backed down, and the Darfur situation was referred by the Security Council to the International Criminal Court in accordance with Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.⁵¹

In 2007, the fourth *ad hoc* tribunal, named the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, was established.⁵² Its very limited mandate was to address a wave of terrorist assassinations in Lebanon that began in February 2005 with the murder of Rafiq Hariri, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, and twenty-two others. The events are plainly within the temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, but there are difficulties with the

⁴⁹ Agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, (2002) 2178 UNTS 138. The establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is discussed in some detail in one of the Court’s early rulings: *Kallon et al.* (SCSL-2004-15, 16 and 17-AR72-E), Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, 13 March 2004.

⁵⁰ UN Doc. S/PV.5158, p. 3. ⁵¹ UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).

⁵² Pursuant to UN Doc. S/RES/1757 (2007).

subject-matter jurisdiction. When the Tribunal was being conceived, there may also have been some concern with a Darfur-like referral of a 'situation' in Lebanon that might raise the issue of Israeli war crimes committed in southern Lebanon during the July 2006 war, when in fact the intention was to limit the tribunal's activities to terrorist bombings of which Syria was an important suspect. Some might argue that terrorist acts, including assassinations, may fall within the scope of crimes against humanity, although this is not necessarily obvious. The report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council acknowledged the existence of a debate on this point.⁵³ But although international, by virtue of its creation, the Tribunal can only prosecute crimes under Lebanese law. It uses a French-inspired procedural model that includes pre-trial judges, victim participation in proceedings, reparations awards and *in absentia* trials.

Finally, the international community continues to explore a concept known as 'hybrid courts'.⁵⁴ These are institutions set up within the framework of national law, but with a strong international participation. In particular, they often involve the presence of foreign judges and prosecutors and apply provisions drawn from international law. In terms of content, they bear many resemblances to the international tribunals, although they are profoundly different in form because they are not created by international law and they do not stand above the national legal order. Examples of such institutions are the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, set up to proceed against Khmer Rouge leaders from the 1970s, and the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese courts, designed for the trial of former Chadian ruler Hissène Habré.

The Rome Statute addresses the relationship between the International Criminal Court and national courts, but it is silent about how the Court

⁵³ Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UN Doc. S/2006/893, paras. 22–3; Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Addendum, Statement by Mr Nicolas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, at the Informal Consultations Held by the Security Council on 20 November 2006, UN Doc. S/2006/893/Add.1.

⁵⁴ Laura A. Dickinson, 'The Promise of Hybrid Courts', (2003) 97 *American Journal of International Law* 295: 'Such courts are "hybrid" because both the institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international and the domestic. Foreign judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local lawyers working with those from other countries. The judges apply domestic law that has been reformed to accord with international standards.' The distinction between 'international' and 'hybrid' tribunals is made in the Secretary-General's August 2004 Report: The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, paras. 40, 45 and 46.

may interact with other international criminal tribunals. When the Statute was being adopted, it was widely believed that the establishment of the International Criminal Court would obviate the need for any further temporary or *ad hoc* tribunals, unless they dealt with matters over which the Court could not exercise jurisdiction, as in the case of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It has become apparent, however, that the Court's capacity is limited and that there may well be a place for international criminal tribunals with jurisdiction parallel to that of the International Criminal Court. A step in this direction has been taken by the African Union with the creation of a Criminal Chamber within the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, a move considered by some to be aimed at undermining the International Criminal Court.

Drafting of the Rome Statute

In 1994, the United Nations General Assembly decided to pursue work towards the establishment of an international criminal court, taking the International Law Commission's draft statute as a basis.⁵⁵ It convened an Ad Hoc Committee, which met twice in 1995.⁵⁶ Debates within the Ad Hoc Committee revealed rather profound differences among States about the complexion of the future court. Some delegations continued to contest the overall feasibility of the project, although their voices became more and more subdued as the negotiations progressed. The International Law Commission draft envisaged a court with 'primacy', much like the *ad hoc* tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. If the court's prosecutor

⁵⁵ All of the basic documents of the drafting history of the Statute, including the draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission, have been reproduced in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1998. Professor Bassiouni has also produced a much more comprehensive two-volume collection of the documents: M. Cherif Bassiouni and William A. Schabas, eds., *The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis and Integrated Text*, 2nd edition, The Hague: Brill, 2016. The proceedings of the Rome Conference have been officially published by the United Nations in a three-volume edition: UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13. Most of the preparatory documents, including the 'non-papers' that are not officially recorded, can be found in the 'Legal Tools' section of the Court's website (www.legal-tools.org).

⁵⁶ Generally, on the drafting of the Statute, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court', (1999) 32 *Cornell International Law Journal* 443; Adriaan Bos, 'From the International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994–1998)', in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R. W. D. Jones, eds., *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary*, vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 35–64.

chose to proceed with a case, domestic courts could not pre-empt this by offering to do the job themselves. In meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, a new concept reared its head, that of ‘complementarity’, through which the court could only exercise jurisdiction if domestic tribunals were unwilling or unable to prosecute. Another departure of the Ad Hoc Committee from the International Law Commission draft was its insistence that the crimes within the court’s jurisdiction be defined in some detail and not simply enumerated. The International Law Commission had contented itself with listing the crimes subject to the court’s jurisdiction – war crimes, aggression, crimes against humanity and genocide – presumably because the draft code of crimes, on which it was also working, would provide the more comprehensive definitional aspects. Beginning with the Ad Hoc Committee, the nearly fifty-year-old distinction between the ‘statute’ and the ‘code’ disappeared. Henceforth, the statute would include detailed definitions of crimes as well as elaborate provisions dealing with general principles of law and other substantive matters. The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the new court was to conform to principles and rules that would ensure the highest standards of justice and that these should be incorporated in the statute itself rather than being left to the uncertainty of judicial discretion.⁵⁷

It had been hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee’s work would set the stage for a diplomatic conference where the statute could be adopted. But it became evident that this was premature. At its 1995 session, the General Assembly decided to convene a ‘Preparatory Committee’, inviting participation by Member States, non-governmental organizations and international organizations of various sorts. The ‘PrepCom’, as it became known, held two three-week sessions in 1996, presenting the General Assembly with a voluminous report comprising a hefty list of proposed amendments to the International Law Commission draft.⁵⁸ It met again in 1997, this time holding three sessions. These were punctuated by informal intersessional meetings, of which the most important was surely that held in Zutphen, in the Netherlands, in January 1998.

⁵⁷ Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/50/22. See Roy S. Lee, ‘The Rome Conference and Its Contributions to International Law’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., *The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 1–39, at 7; Tuiloma Neroni Slade and Roger S. Clark, ‘Preamble and Final Clauses’, in Lee, *ibid.*, pp. 421–50, at 436–7.

⁵⁸ Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/51/22.

The ‘Zutphen draft’ consolidated the various proposals into a more or less coherent text.⁵⁹ The Zutphen draft was reworked somewhat at the final session of the PrepCom, and then submitted for consideration by the Diplomatic Conference.⁶⁰ Few provisions of the original International Law Commission proposal had survived intact. Most of the Articles in the final draft were accompanied with an assortment of options and alternatives, surrounded by square brackets to indicate a lack of consensus, foreboding difficult negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference.⁶¹ Some important issues such as ‘complementarity’ – recognition that cases would only be admissible before the new court when national justice systems were unwilling or unable to try them – were largely resolved during the PrepCom process. The challenge to the negotiators at the Diplomatic Conference was to ensure that these issues were not reopened. Other matters, such as the issue of capital punishment, had been studiously avoided during the sessions of the PrepCom and were to emerge suddenly as impasses in the final negotiations.

Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions adopted in 1996 and 1997,⁶² the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court convened on 15 June 1998 in Rome, at the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization. More than 160 States sent delegates to the Conference, in addition to a range of intergovernmental bodies and literally hundreds of non-governmental organizations. The enthusiasm was quite astonishing, with essentially all of the delegations expressing their support for the concept. Driving the dynamism of the Conference were two new constituencies: a geographically heterogeneous caucus of States known as the ‘like-minded’ and a well-organized coalition of non-governmental organizations.⁶³ The ‘like-minded caucus’, initially chaired by Canada, had been active since the

⁵⁹ Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13.

⁶⁰ Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.

⁶¹ See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Observations Concerning the 1997–98 Preparatory Committee’s Work’, (1997) 25 *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 397.

⁶² UN Doc. A/RES/51/207; UN Doc. A/RES/52/160.

⁶³ On the phenomenal and unprecedented contribution of non-governmental organizations, see William R. Pace and Mark Thieroff, ‘Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., *The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 391–8; William Bourdon, ‘Rôle de la société civile et des ONG’, in *La Cour pénale internationale*, Paris: La Documentation française, 1999, pp. 89–96; Marlies Glasius, *The*

early stages of the PrepCom, gradually consolidating its positions while expanding its membership. By the time the Rome Conference began, the like-minded caucus included more than 60 of the 160 participating States.⁶⁴ The like-minded were committed to a handful of key propositions that were substantially at odds with the premises of the 1994 International Law Commission draft and, by and large, in conflict with the conception of the court held by the permanent members of the Security Council. The principles of the like-minded were as follows: an inherent jurisdiction of the court over the 'core crimes' of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (and, perhaps, aggression); the elimination of a Security Council veto on prosecutions; an independent prosecutor with the power to initiate proceedings *proprio motu*; and the prohibition of reservations to the statute. Although operating relatively informally, the like-minded quickly dominated the structure of the Conference. Key functions, including the chairs of most of the working groups, as well as membership in the Bureau, which was the executive body that directed the day-to-day affairs of the Conference, were taken up by its members. Canada relinquished the chair of the 'like-minded' when the legal advisor to its foreign ministry, Philippe Kirsch, was elected president of the Conference's Committee of the Whole.

But there were other caucuses and groupings at work, many of them reflections of existing formations within other international bodies. The caucus of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was particularly active in its insistence that the crime of aggression be included within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. A relatively new force, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), under the dynamic influence of post-apartheid South Africa, took important positions on human rights, providing a valuable counterweight to the Europeans in this field. The caucus of the Arab and Islamic States was active in a number of areas, including a call for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and support for inclusion of the death penalty within the statute. The beauty of the

International Criminal Court, A Global Civil Society Achievement, London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

⁶⁴ Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Korea (Republic of), Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Venezuela and Zambia.

like-minded caucus, indeed the key to its great success, was its ability to cut across the traditional regional lines. Following the election of the Labour government in the United Kingdom in 1997, the like-minded caucus even managed to recruit a permanent member of the Security Council to its ranks.

The Rome Conference began with a few days of formal speeches from political figures, United Nations officials and personalities from the growing ranks of those actually involved in international criminal prosecution, including the presidents of the two *ad hoc* tribunals and their Prosecutor.⁶⁵ Then the Conference divided into a series of working groups with responsibility for matters such as general principles, procedure and penalties. Much of this involved details, unlikely to create insurmountable difficulties to the extent that the delegates were committed to the success of the endeavour. But a handful of core issues – jurisdiction, the ‘trigger mechanism’ for prosecutions, the role of the Security Council – remained under the wing of the Bureau. These difficult questions were not publicly debated for most of the Conference, although much negotiating took place informally.

One by one, the provisions of the statute were adopted ‘by general agreement’ in the working groups, that is, without a vote. The process was tedious in that it allowed a handful of States or even one of them to hold up progress by refusing to join the consensus. The chairs of the working groups would patiently negotiate compromises, drawing on comments by States that often expressed their views on a provision but then indicated their willingness to be flexible. Within a week of the beginning of the Conference, the working groups were forwarding progress reports to the Committee of the Whole, indicating the provisions that had already met with agreement. These were subsequently examined by the Drafting Committee, chaired by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, for terminological and linguistic coherence in the various official language versions of the statute.

But as the weeks rolled by, the key issues remained to be settled, of which the most important were the role of the Security Council, the list

⁶⁵ For a detailed discussion of the proceedings at the Rome Conference, see Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process’, (1999) 93 *American Journal of International Law* 2; Roy S. Lee, ‘The Rome Conference and Its Contributions to International Law’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., *The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 1–39, particularly pp. 21–3; and Philippe Kirsch, ‘The Development of the Rome Statute’, in Lee, *ibid.*, pp. 451–61.

of 'core crimes' over which the court would have inherent jurisdiction and the scope of its jurisdiction over persons who were not nationals of States Parties. These had not been assigned to any of the working groups and instead were handled personally by the chair of the Committee of the Whole, Philippe Kirsch. With two weeks remaining, Kirsch issued a draft that set out the options on these difficult questions. The problem, though, was that many States belonged to the majority on one question but dissented on others. Finding a common denominator, that is, a workable statute that could reliably obtain the support of two-thirds of the delegates in the event that the draft statute was ever to come to a vote, remained daunting. Suspense mounted in the final week, with Kirsch promising a final proposal that in fact he only issued on the morning of 17 July, the day the Conference was scheduled to conclude. By then it was too late for any changes. Like a skilled blackjack player, Kirsch had carefully counted his cards, yet he had no guarantee that his proposal might not meet unexpected opposition and lead, inexorably, to the collapse of the negotiations. Throughout the final day of the Conference, delegates expressed their support for the 'package', and resisted any attempts to alter or adjust it out of fear that the entire compromise might unravel. The United States tried unsuccessfully to rally opposition, convening a meeting of what it had assessed as waverers. Indeed, hopes that the draft statute might be adopted by consensus at the final session were dashed when the United States exercised its right to demand that a vote be taken. The result was 120 in favour, with 21 abstentions and 7 votes against. The vote was not taken by roll call, and only the declarations made by States themselves indicate who voted for what. The United States, Israel and China stated that they had opposed adoption of the statute.⁶⁶ Among the abstainers were several Arab and Islamic States, as well as a number of delegations from the Commonwealth Caribbean.

In addition to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, on 17 July 1998 the Diplomatic Conference also adopted a Final Act,⁶⁷ providing for the establishment of a Preparatory Commission by the United Nations General Assembly. The Commission was assigned a variety of tasks, of which the most important were the drafting of the Rules of

⁶⁶ UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.9, paras. 28, 33 and 40; Giovanni Conso, 'Looking to the Future', in Roy S. Lee, ed., *The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 471–7. For the positions of the United States and China, see also UN Doc. A/C.6/53/SR.9.

⁶⁷ UN Doc. A/CONF.183/10.

Procedure and Evidence,⁶⁸ providing details on a variety of procedural and evidentiary questions, and the Elements of Crimes,⁶⁹ which elaborate upon the definitions of offences in Articles 6, 7, 8 and 8 *bis* of the Statute. The Commission met the deadline of 30 June 2000, set for it by the Final Act, for the completion of the Rules and the Elements.⁷⁰ Other tasks included drafting an agreement with the United Nations on the relationship between the two organizations, preparation of a host State agreement with the Netherlands, and documents to direct or resolve a range of essentially administrative issues, such as the preliminary budget. An Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court was also adopted. It provides the personnel of the Court with a range of special measures analogous to those of United Nations personnel and diplomats. It is up to individual States to sign and ratify this treaty.⁷¹ The Preparatory Commission held ten sessions, concluding its work in July 2002 just as the Statute was entering into force, although it did not formally dissolve until September 2002.

⁶⁸ Provided for in Art. 51 of the Rome Statute.

⁶⁹ Provided for in Art. 9 of the Rome Statute.

⁷⁰ Elements of Crimes, ASP/1/3, pp. 108–55; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ASP/1/3, pp. 10–107.

⁷¹ Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, ASP/1/3, pp. 215–32. See Phakiso Mochochoko, 'The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities in the International Criminal Court', (2002) 25 *Fordham International Law Journal* 638.